Investigación
calendar_month Publicación: 01/01/2015
Communicating Judicial Retirement
Autor: Álvaro Bustos, Tonja Jacobi
Justices can strategically shape perceptions of their likely retirements, and so influence the President and Senate in choosing an ideologically compatible replacement. Relatively new justices can vote insincerely to affect how their ideologies are perceived, but their strategies are shaped by older justices’ expected retirement probabilities. We show that “strong messages” of retirement are likely when new justices vote insincerely and the new and retiring justices’ ideologies are aligned. “Weak messages” are more likely when new justices vote sincerely or, if they do vote insincerely, the old and new justices’ ideologies are unaligned.
Fuente: International Review in Law and Economics
Volumen: 43, Páginas 107-118
IF-2015: 0,543, AI-2015: 0,389
