Investigación
calendar_month Publicación: 07/10/2024
«The Roles of Selection and Practice in Mitigating Negative Responses to High-Powered Incentives»
Autor: Rosario Macera
Despite substantial evidence for the effectiveness of monetary incentives, some experiments have shown that high-powered incentives might lead to lower performance than lesser incentives. This study explores whether firms have means to counter these potential negative effects. Building on a standard experimental design identifying the drawbacks of large-stake rewards, it shows that when workers either self-select into the task or have prior practice, high-powered incentives lead to higher average performance than a smaller reward. This effect is driven mainly by selection and practice increasing the share of workers who respond positively to high-powered incentives. These results suggest that firms have natural instruments to deal with the potential adverse effects of high-powered incentives.
Fuente: Experimental Economics
Vol. 27, Issue 5 , pag. 973 - 1000
